

Remarks Of

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Thank you ladies and gentlemen. I am happy to have this opportunity to share with you and with people everywhere what I know about some of the activities of the Soviet Government in Southeast Asia. I hope my knowledge of these deeds can act as my modest contribution to the struggle of people everywhere against communism. I also wish to present ideas about political developments within the Soviet Union.

I do not approve of the Soviet communist regime not what is called the Soviet Government. I came to disapprove even before I went abroad to Burma, although my experiences in Burma helped me to understand more fully the evil of communism. I watched the Soviet regime in action and I studied its methods and doctrines quite thoroughly at special institutes designed for persons (like me) to be sent abroad. My classmates and I were considered by the regime to be its first-line ideological fighters. For more than two years, I was a member of the Soviet Embassy in Burma. During this period, I worked for Soviet intelligence.

In June 1958, I found it impossible to continue to work for the Soviet communist regime with a clear conscience. I decided to make my decisive step because, first of all, I wanted to help in the struggle for freedom and democracy of my own Russian people, as well as all other peoples enslaved by the communists. Secondly, I decided to do it in order to help other nations endangered by communism to preserve their freedom and independence. This was especially true about Burma, a country which I came to love, and to which I feel a definite moral obligation.

In the Fall of 1957, while on leave in Moscow, I was informed by high ranking KGB officers that I had been selected to work for the political intelligence group in Burma. The two men who directed me to join KGB were Valdimir Us and Boris Galashin, whom I knew in Burma as high ranking Soviet Embassy officers. They

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told me that I had been selected for KGB since I knew Burma, and the Burmese language. This was a decision that I could not accept or reject. They were only telling me what KGB headquarters had decided.

They had me sign a paper which was an oath to do my best in performing tasks assigned by intelligence superiors and to keep deadly silent about my work. The last sentence of the oath stated that, if I willingly or unwillingly revealed secrets, I should be ready to accept any punishment, including the death sentence. Us and Galashin gave me the false name of Kazakov. After this, they told me what my duties would be for Soviet intelligence in Burma.

I was to translate from Burmese to Russian, secret documents obtained by the Rangoon element of the Political intelligence group. I was to develop contacts in Burmese political circles, in order to gather information. This would lead to my developing "cooperative" politicians, in order to turn them into paid Soviet agents. I was to establish contacts with foreigners in Burma, in order to gather information on the work of foreign embassies and to penetrate them. Lastly, I was to observe the behavior of other Soviet citizens in Burma and report on them.

I had instructions that my intelligence affiliation should be kept secret from other members of the Soviet Embassy in Burma, including Ambassador Shiborin himself. The KGB is supervised by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This organization plants its residents abroad under cover as diplomats, Embassy workers, representatives of the State Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (VOKS), SOVEKSPORTFILM, SOVINFORMBUREAU, and with interpreters or technicians working with Soviet aid projects.

In Burma, the KGB unit's chief was Ivan Vozniy, who had the rank of Colonel of State Security. Boris Galashin, the man who "recruited" me for intelligence work in Moscow, had the cover rank of "Attache." He was responsible for my political reliability (I wonder where Boris is now?)

The assistant to the chief of the group was Igor Trushkovskiy. He had the cover job of representative of VOKS in Burma and the rank of "Second Secretary" and "Cultural Attache" in the Soviet Embassy.

Two other members of the group were Mikhail Vologzanin, who had the cover job of SOVEKSPORTFILM representative, and Dimitry Dityatev, who had the rank of Second Secretary and was Head of the Embassy Consular Office. There are of course other people, including special technical personnel such as radio operators and code maker, who work only for the intelligence group.

The activities of the Soviet intelligence in Burma are to subvert the nationalist political forces and politicians, gather secret information about the Burmese Government and to carry out special psychological warfare. The group also had the responsibility to observe and report on all Soviet citizens in Burma, to discover the unreliable elements and those that had been influenced by "capitalist" propaganda and surroundings. The group also carries out espionage work towards the penetration of foreign embassies in Burma, especially the American.

In their work, the KGB in Burma is responsible only to its headquarters in Moscow. The Ambassador himself is kept under constant physical and technical watch, and reports on his activities are regularly sent to Moscow by the group.

This intelligence group works with its agents in the political parties, such as the pro-communist National United Front. The largest part of my work was the translations of reports and documents of these agents who penetrated the political parties, in addition to governmental departments and the Burmese Army.

The main bases from which the secret intelligence activity was carried out are the offices in the Embassy, of VOKS, SOVEKSPORTFILM, and SOVINFORMBUREAU. The group uses three separate units of special radio equipment for their work in Burma.

The KGB element has a special assignment from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, to maintain contact with the legal communist parties aboveground and the insurgent communists underground. These contacts are maintained by exchanges of letters and messages and by secret personal meetings.

Personal contacts can be carried out at very high level, such as that between Bobodshan Gafurov, a member of Central Committee of CPSU who visited Burma, and U Ba Nyein, a leader of the Communist National United Front. In Burma, I worked as an interpreter at secret meetings between these two men.

One of the most important activities of the group in which I personally participated was special psychological warfare that embraced the entire Southeast Asian region. The Rangoon group of the KGB was regularly planting in the Burmese press articles prepared in Moscow KGB headquarters.

These articles were forgeries about political parties and political leaders of other countries of Southeast Asia, accusing them of being tools of imperialism, dishonest and corrupt. They were aimed at isolating and liquidating anti and non-communist parties and leaders who were working against communism. They were also aimed at spoiling relations between the people of these countries and the anti-communist world. There were forgeries about the American support of the Indonesian rebels, American brigery of the Indian Finance Minister, frequent violations of Cambodia's sovereignty and the "subversive" activity of Japan in Southeast Asia. There were many, many more.

The complex planting of the articles in the Burmese press worked as follows:

1. Articles in the Russian language were received in Rangoon from Moscow on microfilm, through intelligence channels, and reproduced as photocopies at the Embassy.
2. I then translated the articles into English and Burmese. (I replaced a KGB man named Ivan Rogachev in this job.)
3. The Moscow articles were then planted in Burmese newspapers, through trusted Burmese agents.
4. It was then my duty to check the articles after they had been published in newspapers (both Burmese and English language) against the original Russian text.
5. My notes on the accuracy of the translation and reproductions of any variations from the Russian original, were sent back to Moscow, this time through TASS channels.

6. The Soviet Information Service (SOVINFORMBUREAU), TASS, Radio Moscow, official Soviet diplomatic representatives abroad, and other newspapers were then obliged to publish and redistribute these materials all over the world as true stories.

The main Burmese newspapers used by the group for this work were the Communist controlled "Mirror" and "Botataung," although the "Peoples Journal," "The New Light of Burma," the "Path," the "Mandalay Lodu," and the English language "Burman" were also used. The Dagon Publishing House was also exploited by Soviet Intelligence in Burma.

One of the best examples of such fabrications was a pair of articles planted in the "Mirror" by the Vozniy group, during the Spring of 1958, at the very peak of Indonesian insurgent activity. One of the articles reproduced a letter, purportedly from an Indonesian rebel leader named Sjamsuddin to American Ambassador MacArthur in Tokyo. The other was purported to be from "Admiral Frost," of the United States Navy, to another Indonesian rebel leader. At Ivan Vozniy's direction, I translated both of these "letters" from the Russian language photocopies into English, and later checked the articles published in the Burmese language "Mirror" against the original Russian photocopies. The Sjamsuddin "letter" was dated March 15, 1958, but was published in the "Mirror" in May. In it, Sjamsuddin asked Mac Arthur for help and talked of SEATO aiding the rebellion. The Frost "letter," which was published in the "Mirror" in early June, advised the rebels not to surrender and stated that the United States would continue to help them. These articles were signed by the "Mirror's" "Special Correspondent in Djakarta."

These Rangoon "Mirror" articles were then distributed among Indonesian political circles, played up in the world communist press and even re-published in an Indonesian language newspaper the "Bintang Timur," which was also controlled by Soviet intelligence.

This activity of the Rangoon intelligence group is only part of the large Soviet press network throughout the whole region of Southeast Asia, including India, Indonesia and Thailand. In Indonesia Soviet intelligence uses such newspapers as the "Bintang Timur" and in India, "Blitz," the "Delhi Times." In Thailand "La Patrie" was used in the same way.

In Burma, there is now the celebrated Kovtunenکو case, which has been going on for many months. Kovtunenکو is the TASS representative in Burma who, in the Spring of 1959, published an article in the TASS bulletin which said three Burmese newspapers (the "Nation," "Guardian," and "Reporter") were used by the American Embassy to undermine Burma's policy of neutrality. This article was written in Moscow originally, planted in the "Delhi Times," and signed by their non-existent Rangoon Correspondent. The article was then sent to Rangoon, for distribution through TASS channels. In this case, the Soviet propaganda machine did not work well and a definite mistake was made in the last link of the chain. The channel of distribution of this material was not properly selected and the editor of "Nation" sued Kovtunenکو for defamation of character. Kovtunenکو hid out in the Soviet Embassy, to escape trial. As far as I know, he is still afraid to come out.

The intelligence group I have described is not alone in the Embassy, there are other groups with intelligence duties. The GRU group or Military Intelligence is operated by the Military Attache group. The former chief of this group was Colonel Stryguine whose unsuccessful attempt to defect to the Burmese Government is well known. Colonel Stryguine's replacement was to be Colonel Anatoliy Popov, a highly experienced intelligence officer.

Another group is the Referentura, which is responsible to the Number Ten Department of the Foreign Office in Moscow. In this group are intelligence officers, such as First Secretary Maksin, and Ambassador's Secretary Aleksandr Razvin, and another section of code makers and radio operators. The Referentura is responsible for keeping files of all secret documents and communications with Moscow. They also had the responsibility of reporting on the behavior of Soviet citizens in Burma and for technical work.

An Economic intelligence service works through its economic advisor Vasilii Panov, who is the representative of the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations (GKES) in Burma. This group has definite intelligence duties.

There is no doubt that the real intention of the Moscow and Peking regimes is to achieve a Communist Burma. The original Stalinist plan for achieving a Communist Burma through the armed efforts of the communist insurgents has definitely failed. The insurrection was started on orders of Moscow in 1948, but the Chinese Peoples Republic soon appeared and direct control over the Burmese insurgents was passed to Peking. The failure of the insurgency was recognized by Moscow in 1954, and all stress was shifted to bringing the communists to power by subversion and other "legal" means.

The aboveground communist parties of the National United Front were assigned the main role in this new approach, while the insurgents had the support task. Both were directed and supported by the Soviet and Chinese Embassies. A determined, and to some extent successful, attempt was made to achieve power by parliamentary means in the 1956 general elections, when with the financial aid of the Soviet and Chinese Governments and coercion of the voters by the communist insurgents, the National United Front won about forty seats in the Burmese Parliament.

Conditions became quite favorable for the communists after the 1956 elections, especially after the split of the Anti Fascist Peoples Freedom League in early 1958. The split occurred with the aid of Soviet intelligence. This progress for the communists was interrupted in October 1958 when Prime Minister U Nu transferred Premiership to General Ne Win. Several hundred of the subverters and agents of Peking and Moscow were arrested and the Ne Win Government began to achieve great successes in the liquidation of the communist insurgents.

Soviet and Chinese Governments plans were frustrated. The Soviet Embassy in reports to Moscow labeled the Ne Win Government "pro-imperialist," "fascist" and accused it of "liquidating the peoples freedoms and rights." The Soviet Embassy was especially angered by the Ne Win Government's correct attitude of true neutrality.

As a result of the changed situation in Burma, a new plan has been developed for the communist achievement of power. Two months prior to my departure from the Soviet Embassy, the Embassy received a document from Moscow that gave the official line of Soviet Government's actions in Burma.

According to the decision reached in Moscow and relayed to the Soviet Embassy as guidance, the following efforts should be made in Burma:

1. To increase the support by all possible means to the Communist National United Front.
2. Split the leadership of the Burmese Army by all possible means.
3. Split and weaken the influence of the Stable AFPFL.

The final goals of Peking and Moscow in Burma are the same, although there are some differences in their tactics. Burma and Cambodia along with Indonesia are recognized to be in the sphere of influence of China while the recognized Soviet sphere of influence includes, in this area, India, Ceylon and Afghanistan. The immediate interest of Moscow is to have Burma as a weak but friendly neutral, with the Communists working slowly towards achieving a communist government by parliamentary methods. The insurgency is considered to be a lost cause by the Soviet Government and even harmful to Soviet interests. The Chinese generally don't believe in the usefulness of neutrality and has therefore maintained support of the communist insurgents and kept the Burma border problem unsettled.

While the Soviet Government hopes to seize Burma's hand in order to more easily seize her throat, the Chinese Communists endeavor to seize Burma's throat directly. The result is the same.



Now I would like to talk a little about my own country. I have read a good bit of criticism of the USSR--some intelligent and some not. I want to give some of my opinions about the country in which I was born, raised, and educated.

The Communist regime in the Soviet Union faces a general crisis. The driving force of this general crisis is the immense contradiction between the real interests of the people and the country on the one hand and the selfish interests of the regime on the other. This general crisis reveals itself in the way that today people cannot live in the manner and conditions which they had yesterday; and the ruling class cannot rule the country in the way and with the methods it used yesterday.

Every activity and policy, both foreign and domestic, of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Government does not serve the interests of the country, but of the regime. By the word regime, I mean the upper strata of the ruling class as represented by the top party leaders and the Soviet government.

All of the economic achievements of the Soviet Union have been made not because of the Communist regime, but rather in spite of it. Today the regime prevents the economy of the country from reaching a quicker, easier, healthier, more efficient, all-sided development, in the interest of the people, rather than the interests of the ruling class.

The Communist dictatorial regime deprives the people of practically all of their personal and political freedoms and rights. Because of this, the life of the majority of the people in the Soviet Union is basically abnormal and unhappy. There are very few traces of democracy in the Soviet Union, as you know democracy in the Free World.

Soviet foreign policy is criminal. Since the end of the Second World War, it has been aimed at increasing international tensions, and preserving the cold war and armaments race. It has endangered world civilization and therefore the very lives of the people of the Soviet Union as well as elsewhere. The regime seeks to expand its influence and control over other areas, and through this to strengthen its position in the Soviet Union. The overall purpose of Soviet foreign policy is to preserve and strengthen its power and control inside the Soviet Union.

There is no single vital problem or question in the Soviet Union which the Communist Party can claim it alone can solve. The Communist Party is not only not needed, but is even harmful to the country. Its existence is unnatural

and artificial. It maintains itself in power only by force, suppression, terror, slanderous propaganda, and tremendous falsification. It maintains its power with the help of the iron curtain, the isolation of the Soviet people from other people, the cold war, and the arms race.

This regime faces a general crisis, as it has ever since it took power in 1917. This general crisis is a contradiction between the interests of the people and the interests of the ruling class. This general crisis reached maturity on the eve of the Second World War, but the most dangerous point was reached in the period surrounding Stalin's death. In 1953, the country was on the verge of an explosion, which if it had happened, would have buried the Communist regime. Stalin died just in time. It was urgently necessary for the ruling class to take drastic measures to prevent this explosion. We can only speculate about the form this explosion might have taken. The fact is that the whole atmosphere in the Soviet Union had reached the utmost tension at that time.

Drastic measures were taken by the Communist rulers. It had to abandon Stalin's methods, which had been a complete fiasco. It had to introduce some liberalization, relax political tensions, reorganize industry and agriculture, and modify its foreign policy. The regime had to make definite concessions to the Soviet people. All this process of liberalization and democratization was nothing but a retreating by the regime. It was a step back from absolute and unchallenged control over the country, and a step forward in an evolutionary process. The culminating point of this first step was the 20th Congress of the Communist Party, with its denunciation of Stalin.

The 20th Party Congress, and all of the changes leading up to it and subsequent to it, seemed to be an indication of the strength of the regime. In reality they were nothing but an indication of its true weakness. The events which closely followed the 20th Congress leave no doubt about this. These events were the uprising in Tbilisi, revolts and strikes in the concentration camps throughout the Soviet Union, the Polish and Hungarian revolutions, and what is especially significant, student demonstration and workers' strikes in the Soviet Union.

Liberalization, democratization and changes temporarily lessened the gap between the regime and the people, but at the same time undermined the very foundations of absolute dictatorship upon which the regime rested.

In general, economic and political conditions in the country improved, but these improvements did not strengthen the position of the regime. The liberalization, democratization and changes introduced produced an acute necessity for further liberalization, democratization, and new changes.

For the first time in their lives, the Soviet people have enjoyed some personal freedoms and rights. They breathe more freely, because they know there can be no return to the overwhelming terror of the bloody Stalin period. They are still deprived of practically all political freedoms and rights, and many personal freedoms and rights. The first taste of freedom made them feel and understand this more acutely. It made them desire and demand complete political and personal freedom and rights.

The economic reorganization and changes introduced by Khrushchev were only half-measures. They will not accomplish their aims unless further efforts are made in the same direction.

The economy continues to be one-sided and unhealthy. The disproportional development of the economy has reached such a state that its liquidation cannot be delayed any longer. The highly developed heavy industry does not have the necessary base of a proportionally developed agricultural and consumer goods production. But this situation in the economy cannot be changed without a cessation of the cold war and the arms race. People are living better economically, and they are enthusiastic to get what they have a right to have according to their labor.

The people in the Soviet Union now more and more clearly understand that it is no one but the Soviet Government which is interested in the continuation of the cold war and arms race.

So today the regime is again confronted with an extremely difficult situation. The general crisis and the evolutionary process are now entering a new stage. This present stage of the general crisis has its own characteristic features. I think there are two of them.

The first feature is the fact that organized opposition to the Communist regime is coming to life in the Soviet Union. Nowadays there is a necessity, and what is especially important, the possibility, for organized opposition. When speaking of organized opposition I do not mean the possibility for a big opposition political party, but rather the possibility for people to discuss

more or less freely vital questions of their lives, including political questions, to exchange their thoughts, and through this to arrive at common understanding and common decisions. Nowadays there are even possibilities for starting small opposition groups, which work under various camouflages, and even underground anti-Communist groups. Such things were completely unthinkable during Stalin's time. Now they are possible.

The student demonstrations and workers' strikes in late 1956 and early 1957 were the first open indications of the existence of organized opposition. Soon after the Hungarian Revolution, the students of Moscow University adopted a resolution at a Komsomol meeting, which they sent to the Central Committee of the Party. In this resolution, they demanded that foreign broadcast jamming be stopped, that the foreign press be allowed free distribution and, most significantly, that a two-party system be introduced in the Soviet Union. The last was practically a demand for the liquidation of the Communist regime.

There are indications that the leading role of this opposition will be played mainly by the technical intelligentsia and the so-called technocrats. The existence of such an organized position is especially dangerous for the regime and fills with new substance the whole evolutionary process.

The second feature of the present stage of the general crisis faced by the regime is the drastic necessity to liquidate the unbalanced nature of the economy. In order to do this, they must relax international tensions and slow down the cold war and arms race. These are the main desires and demands of the peoples in the Soviet Union today. The liquidation of the cold war, international tensions, and the arms race are the key problems of the present stage of the general crisis. The liquidation of the explosive atmosphere of terror and suppression and internal political tension produced by them during Stalin's period were the key problems of the previous stage of this general crisis.

Besides these two features, there is also the question of who will be chosen by the ruling class to attempt solutions to the problems confronting the regime. Among Soviet intelligentsia there is today definite speculation that Khrushchev's group has used up its willingness and ability to undertake further liberalization, democratization, and changes, and thus to preserve the control of the regime over the country. There is speculation whether it will be Khrushchev's or some other group from the ruling class which will be less reactionary, less conservative, more liberal and democratic. It will

be more willing and able to take the second step in the necessary retreat of the regime. I say necessary because it is the only way for it to retain itself in power.

Khrushchev's visit to the United States had definite aims. First of all, he tried to present this visit as a recognition by the West and its leader the United States, of the strength, successfulness, and thus the rightness of the existence of the Communist regime. When speaking of the relaxation of international tensions, stopping the cold war and of disarmament, he has been trying to deceive people again about the peaceful intentions of the regime. At the same time, he definitely intended to give the impression that his group is willing to take a step toward meeting the interests of the country and the demands of the people. In his statements made in the Soviet Union after the visit, he renewed his promises to lessen international tensions and stop the cold war. He also promised to place more stress on consumer goods production and to raise the standard of living of the Soviet people, which can be understood as some sort of concession of the regime to the people.

By big promises and small concessions, Khrushchev intends to weaken popular opposition to the Communist regime in general, and opposition to his own group from other groups in the ruling class, in particular.

His visit to the United States, and his statements, are indications of his intention to keep the reins of power and not to surrender them to some one else. He speaks about relaxation of international tensions not because he is such a liberal man, but because the Communist regime which he represents is forced to maneuver in the face of the new stage of the general crisis in the Soviet Union.

All this can be understood as a sign of the beginning of the second step in the retreat of the regime. Khrushchev's actions should not therefore be taken as an indication of the strength of the regime, but quite on the contrary, as an indication of its weakness. Like the maneuvers during the previous step, they again can only temporarily reduce the general crisis, but at the same time they will inevitably again further undermine the very foundation of the regime.

There is a definite evolutionary process going on in the Soviet Union. Each step in the regime's retreat in the face of this general crisis is a step

forward to the eventual burial of the Communist regime. It cannot be stopped. It goes on because of internal forces. The policies of the Free World cannot force the immediate fulfillment of this process, nor can they bring it to a halt. But the policies of the Free World governments can hasten or slow this evolution as they see fit.

The process will inevitably lead to the creation of a democratic system in the Soviet Union, with a government in power which will serve the real interests of the country and the people.

I want to touch on one more point of misconception and misunderstanding on the part of some people in the Free World about the real nature of the relations between the Russian nationals and the Communist regime of the Soviet Union. There are people in the West who propagate the idea that this regime represents and is supported by a majority of Russian nationals. This misconception shows itself in small points. People and the press frequently call the Soviet Embassy the Russian Embassy, the Soviet intelligence service the Russian intelligence service, Russian foreign policy instead of Soviet foreign policy, and even instead of Soviet imperialism, Russian imperialism. This misconception can go even so far and take such a harmful and dangerous form as in the statement by the United States Senate concerning Captive Nations Week last July. A definite idea can be seen in this statement that nations were captives not of Soviet imperialism but of Russian imperialism.

The fact is completely ignored that the Russian nation is the first among captive nations. The Russian nation has suffered perhaps more than any other nation from Communism. It is the first victim of Communism and hence the first enemy of it.

What we have now is a life and death struggle between Communism and the Free World. There should be no relaxation in the face of the natural evolutionary process now going on in the Soviet Union. The weaker the Communist regime is in the Soviet Union, the more adventuristic will be its foreign policy and endeavors abroad. The weaker it is, the greater will be its necessity to balance internal failures by external successes.